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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COY RINGO, et al., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 10255 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Coy Ringo appeals from the denial of his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus by the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant Coy Ringo and others filed a petition in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, chal-
lenging their detention in the California State Prison at 
Folsom, California, pursuant to an interstate compact 
agreement between the State of Utah and the State of 
California. The respondent, subsequent to the filing of 
appellant's petition, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. On August 28, 1964, the matter was 
heard before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, sitting in 
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the Third Judicial District. On October 9, 1964, Judge 
Swan made a minute entry denying the appellant's petition 
for habeas corpus and granting the state's motion to dismiss 
the petition. Subsequently, on the 4th day of November 
1964, a notice of appeal was filed. No order was ever en-
tered by the court reflecting the court's judgment as recited 
in the minute entry. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the appeal should be dis-
missed. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
The appellant Coy Ringo was committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the crime of robbery on November 15, 
1955. Subsequently, on l\1ay 23, 1962, the appellant \ras 
transferred, pursuant to action by Governor George D. 
Clyde and in accordance with the Western Interstate Cor-
rections Compact adopted in 1959, to the State of Cali-
fornia for imprisonment where he is now being held in Fol-
som Penitentiary. Between the time of appellant's original 
commitment to the Utah State Prison and his transfer 
to the California authorities, he was adjudged guilty of 
another crime, being assault on a convict with malice afore-
thought, in violation of 76--7-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; State v. Ringo, 14 U.2d 49, 377 P.2d 646. 
ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DIS~IISSED SINCE NO FINAL 
ORDER HAS EVER BEEN ENTERED IN THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 396 P.2d 830 ( Ctah 1964)' 
this court observed that where the appellant had failed to 
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have a final judgment entered in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, the appeal was premature and should be dismissed. In 
the instant case the record reflects no final judgment by the 
trial court. The only evidence of the trial court's decision 
was a minute entry to the effect that the state's motion to 
dismiss the appellant's petition was granted. It is well estab-
lished that a minute entry, showing the entry of order, is not 
a final judgment which will sustain an appeal. Robison v. 
Fillmore Commercial & Savings Bank, 61Utah398, 213 P. 
790; Lukich v. Utah Construction Co., 46 Utah 317, 150 P. 
298. Consequently, it is submitted that the instant appeal 
should be dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT THERE 
IS NO BASIS FOR RELIEF. 
The appellant's sole contention is that his confinement at 
Folsom Prison in California, pursuant to the Western Inter-
state Corrections Compact, is contrary to the Constitution 
of the United States, Article I, Section 10, and contrary to 
the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18, in that it has 
an ex post facto application to the appellant. 
Section 77-63-1, U.C.A. 1953, adopted the Western 
Interstate Corrections Compact into law on behalf of the 
State of Utah in 1959. It allows the State of Utah to enter 
into a contract with the various thirteen western states, 
including California, in order to 
"* * * improve their institutional facilities and provide 
programs of sufficiently high quality for the confine-
ment treatment and rehabilitation of various types of 
' off enders, * * *. '' 
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Pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, a 
contract was entered into between the State of Utah and 
the State of California and as a result thereof the appellant 
was transferred, from the State of Utah to the State of 
California in accordance with the act, to undergo his con-
finement at Folsom Penitentiary in California. 77-63-2, 
U.C.A. 1953, empowers the Board of Corrections to trans-
fer any inmate to any institution within or without the 
State of Utah, pursuant to Article III of the Compact, after 
a contract has been entered into. The governor, pursuant to 
77-63-5, U.C.A. 1953, is expressly authorized to enter into 
contracts with states which are parties to the Western Inter-
state Corrections Compact. The compact does not provide 
for an increase in the minimum or maximum sentence 
which an inmate may serve. In no way does the compact 
increase the penal sanctions imposed against the individual 
inmate. The sole purpose of the compact and the result that 
it achieves is to allow the states to use institutions of other 
states which may be more suitable for confinement of a par-
ticular prisoner. 
It is well established that the provisions of Article I, 
Section 10, of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 18, of the Utah Constitution apply only to penal 
laws which have the effect of applying retroactively to make 
criminal an act done which was not criminal when per-
formed, or to aggravate a crime or intensive the punish-
ment, or alter the legal rules of evidence, making for an 
easier conviction. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec-
tion 351 notes: 
"The expression 'ex post facto laws' is a technical 
one which was in use long before the Revolution and 
had acquired an appropriate meaning by legislators, 
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lawyers, and authors. The phrase is one which relates 
exclusively to criminal or penal statutes." 
In this regard, in In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492, it 
was rnled that a Kansas statute providing for the restraint 
and care of the criminally insane, enacted subsequent to the 
commission of the crime, was not ex post facto since it was 
not a criminal act but was one prescribing for the care and 
treatment of insane persons. In Rubin, et al., The Law of 
Criminal Correction, page 279, speaking with reference to 
interjurisdictional cooperation, it is stated: 
"* * * 'a prisoner has no constitutional right to be in-
carcerated in a particular geographic location. Prison-
ers confined inf ederal penitentiaries, for example, may 
be confined in any part of the United States without 
violation the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'" 
Congress has apparently felt that there is no constitutional 
objection to allowing state prisoners to be confined in fed-
eral penitentiaries since they have expressly authorized the 
Attorney General to receive state prisoners for confinement 
in federal correctional institutions. 18 U.S.C. 5003. The 
sole purpose of such interjurisdictional compacts is to pro-
vide a modern device for rehabilitation. See Hinkle, Inter-
state Cooperative Institutionalization - a Modern Device 
for Rehabilitation, 8 Journal of Public Law 509 ( 1959). 
As is noted in Rubin, et al., The Law of Criminal Correc-
tion, page 284, the principal purpose behind acts similar to 
the Western Interstate Corrections Compact is to allow the 
transfer of prisoners to meet the best needs of the prisoner 
and the confinement system: 
"The leaislature has full authority to determine 
b h where prisoners may be sent. It usually delegates t e 
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responsibility to the courts, but it may also assign it to 
an administrative agency, and this is not an invasion of 
judicial power. The power is important for a correc-
tion department whose institutions have been diversi-
fied. Thus it has been observed that 'the difference 
between the various institutions in our penal system is 
no longer a difference in the degree of discomfort each 
will impose upon prisoners, but rather a difference in 
the security or treatment that is needed for particular 
individuals, since all our penal institutions today seek 
to rehabilitate the prisoner. In order to use the various 
institutions to the best practical advantage, it is neces-
sary that certain prisoners be transferred from time 
to time for the benefit of those around them and them-
selves.' Transfers are commonly made for reasons of 
discipline or security, reclassification, or hospital treat-
ment." 
It is obvious from what has been noted above that this does 
not constitute ex post facto legislation. 
In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386, the United 
States Supreme Court enumerated the factors that may 
make a law ex post facto: 
"* * * 1st. Every law that makes an action done before 
the passing of the law, and which was innocent when 
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than 
it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes 
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than 
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. 
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less or different testimony than the law re-
quired at the time of the commission of the offence, 
in order to convict the offender." 
An analysis of the corrections compact against the enu-
merated forms of ex post facto legislation makes it mani-
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fest that the Western Interstate Corrections Compact is not 
ex post facto legislation merely because a prisoner, sub-
sequent to its enactment, has his place of confinement 
changed. 
In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U.S.) 138, the Supreme 
Court of the United States stated: 
"***A ex post facto law is one which renders an act 
punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable 
when committed." 
In the instant case, the appellant's conviction has always 
been punishable by confinement in a prison for a period of 
the rest of his natural life. The mere fact that the place of 
his confinement is changed does not enhance the punish-
ment or change the nature of the sentence. See also Corwin, 
Constitution of the United States of America, (1952), page 
327. In Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 ( 1915), 
South Carolina changed the punishment for a capital crime 
from hanging to electrocution and provided that it would 
take place in the state penitentiary and further made vari-
ous changes in the manner in which the execution would be 
carried out. The United States Supreme Court ruled that 
this was not ex post facto legislation. This court in the case 
of Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 103 
Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 (1943), noted that the Utah and 
federal constitutions prohibiting ex post facto legislation 
are limited to criminal and penal matters. 
In the instant case it is apparent that the purpose of the 
kgislation was to assist in carrying out the correctional pur-
poses of prison confinement to rehabilitate and to maintain 
adequate discipline. There is no basis for a conclusion that 
the instant legislation is ex post facto merely because it was 
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enacted after the appellant's first conviction which he is still 
serving. 
POINT III 
HABEAS CORPUS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY TO 
CHANGE THE PLACE OF CONFINEMENT. 
It is well established that habeas corpus is not an appro-
priate remedy to challenge the place of a prisoner's confine-
ment. Consequently, the court was well within its preroga-
tives in dismissing the petition as an attempt to use an in-
appropriate remedy for the result the appellant sought to 
achieve. In Ex parte TruittJ 54 F.Supp. 999 (D.C. E.D. 
Ill. 1944), the court observed that habeas corpus was not an 
appropriate remedy to challenge the place of confinement 
even if the petitioner's commitment directed he serve in an 
institution different from that where he was being held. 
In U.S. ex rel Gapinski v. RagenJ 152 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 
1945), a state prisoner challenged his transfer from the Illi-
nois State Penitentiary to an institution for the criminally 
insane. In rejecting his petition for habeas corpus, the court 
states: 
"Petitioner's complaint is directed to his transfer 
from Joliet to Menard. This is an administrative func-
tion and one which is authorized by the Illinois Stat-
utes. See Ill.Stat.Ann. Chap. 108, Secs. 110-112. In 
fact, the officials are required to make periodic ex-
aminations in order to determine whether or not any 
inmate of a penal institution should be transferred to 
the Psychiatric Division. The record demonstrates 
that the administrative officials followed the statute 
relative to petitioner's transfer. His complaint is with-
out foundation for purposes of this petition." 
See also Swanson v. ]onesJ 151 Neb. 767, 39 N.W.2d 557 
( 1949); ViRileos v. State, 84 Ariz. 404, 330 P.2d 116 
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( 1958) . In the latter case, the Arizona Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the petitioner's confinement was at an 
institution contrary to specific directives of the Arizona 
Constitution but ruled that habeas corpus was an inappro-
priate remedy to effect the transfer. 
This court has heretofore recognized limitations on the 
power of habeas corpus. Jones v. Moore, 61Utah383, 213 
P. 191; Chapman v. Graham, 2 U.2d 156, 270 P.2d 821. 
Certainly the petitioner has no basis for habeas corpus 
attacking the place of his confinement whereas here the 
transfer is obviously for the purpose of discipline or because 
the conditions of petitioner warrant the transfer and where 
the transfer is authorized by law. 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, 
Sec. 29-1. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court acted prop-
erly in dismissing the appellant's petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's contention that his confinement, pur-
suant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, is in 
violation of the Federal or Utah Constitutions is patently 
without merit. If any event, the petitioner may not attack 
the place of his confinement by writ of habeas corpus. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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of a pleading purpo&1ting to 
state a cause of action or 
defense, all the faata allaqed 
and properly set forth in the 
pleadinq th\UI attacked must, 
Lor the purpose of the ruling 
on t'be attack., be aall\l'Md 'to 
be true." 
:',lso, in the case of slater vs. Salt 
Lake City, found at 115 U. 476, 206 P. 
2d 153, the supreme Court of the State 
':>f Utah held that where the trial court 
had suatained a general 4tlll'1¥.r9S, the 
Supreme Coust auat accept the alleqationa 
of fact coatained 1n the eomplaiat •• 
being true. 
Xn the caee of Thomas G. Bearat and 
Lois v. Bear•t, bia wife ••· Bifhway 
D0partment of the State of Utah, found at 
397 p * ~d 71, __ u. _ _,., t.b• Utah 
state supreme court apin indicated that 
\,•here the District court dismi.••• a 
_·ompL1int, that for the purpoaee of an 
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..:.t 1·pea l, the Supreme Court must accept the 
facts alleged therein aa true. 
UTAH STA.TB COllS'l"l.'l't.Pn'.Cll AllD mB OORB'l'ITU-
TIC* OI' BB UllDlll> ftABa. 
Article I, Section 18 •f t:b• ee..ti-
tution of Utah provide•• 
"Jlo »ill of at:•ai.JMlar, u potlt 
facto law, or law JapairiAt the 
ohli~tion of aont:ractta ahall 
be paaaed. • 
Article I, ieGtiGn 10 ot t'Jae COnsti-
tution of the uni~ at.a~ p~des as 
followa: 
"No atat.e ahall eat-.it int:• any 
txeaty, alliance or confederationr 
qrant letters of marque and 
repriaal1 aoia lllOIMIJ', ... bill.a 
of credit, make anything but 
9old .na ailvar coia :in ~ 
of payment of debts, pass any 
bill of attaiAde~, ex poat faotw) 
law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of cGDtracts, or t:o 
, r~nt any title of nobility." 
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'!BB WBS'l'BRl!f ~TB ~OU OQlt-
PACT IS EX POST PAClO t11B11 AR-PLUD l'O 
PBRSOlfS WBO WBR.B aGIVXcm.D Am> S8l'DClW 
PRIOR '1"0 DW •ABSAGB. 
ln Wharton'• Cri•inal Law Section 
20 at paqe 43 it 1a atatad aa follotin11 
"By virtue of tb• ~owiaiona 
of the United states Constitution, 
neither the aanqreaa nor the 
state leqialaturea may adopt 
ax post: faet.o legialaUOA, that 
is, a statute is unconstitu~ional 
whiah at:t...,U to app~y mtlfO-
actively a penalty or punishment 
to an act wlaiah waa innoG9tt w,b.en 
done, or which increases the 
penalty 'Which wu acu<Jhed 1:o Che 
act at the time of ita comnd•efon, 
or in aay way al•en i:h• poai.tion 
of the defendant to his dia-
advaata'l'I. • 
Ona of the major ia•u•• preae11ted 
by the appellant in hi• petition for a 
writ of habaaa corpia and in his appeal 
ia .:.:hether the waatarn IntentatG Corre~-
7 
'· 
1 '. 
;> 
r: .• ' J .I ' . 
. \' 
-~ !' 
., 
.:~. ~ ~ :! .. ' .. ~ ::-... .... ~.:...!..·~; '·~. 
t.,.• . .:_ 
·'·' 
-~ 
• ; J 
L 
• t .. 
: r:-· ~ _.·. ... ~ .. 
.. , 
, !J ' ,,. ~ ,_ 
1 . 
f ' . 
: r. 
\. 
·i..:• 
~·•·-<" - • 
-- J. l 
'")':-.iJ 
... : ,~ ·.: 
i" .• 
·: 
tions CC>mpact is ex poat facto aa to a 
1:-·eraon who waa tried, convicted and aeaten-
ced prior to the pasaa9e thereof. Both 
the Utah State Coa•titutioa aad tbe 
Gonatitution of the United Stat.. pro-
~ibit ex poet facto 199i1lation. 
In the case of Bx Pane ri.ra fouN\ 
dt 31 &. B. 2d 482, the ~upz-. C::~ Of -
the state of Cl1io wae c:onfJrOAted wA.tla • 
similar situation. Ill the Qiio <:ase, aa 
individual kad been a~d to aerve 
a term in the Obio st.ate Jleforwatocy. 
3ubeequently, an aC't ~ .-ffaoU.,. 
1·lhich perm.i tted the tra.n.sfc of the 
µriaoner to the Ohio State »-.itetJ.&ry. 
The prisoner waa t!her•ft.er confined in 
~ ~rison farua at the atate p4nitentiary. 
'l'he Ohio supreme Court held that partica-
Vlr act ex poat facto as to Mr. Fl.oft 
tnd grutted relief. 
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Where Utah prisoners are taken from 
the utah State Penitentiary and incar-
r:::~eratcd in various places of confinement 
throughout the several states which are 
rneribers of the Com.pact, the Utah prison-
ers .Jre deprived of their. rights to 
.·onfer with their local apirit:ual advis-
or, their local counsel, and are ~rohibi­
ted from visiting with their friends and 
relatives. This ia obviously an altera-
tion of their punishment to their 
detriment and disadvantage. '!be ap~lica­
tion of the Western Interatate Correction.a 
Com1act is there.fore ex po•t facto as to 
E,eraons who w$re tried, convicted a.nd aen-
tenced prior to ita paaaage. 
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iT .IT!IER THE LEGISLATIVE NOR THE EXECU'l'IVB 
mt\N:~IES OF GOVERNMENT CAN REVERSE cm 
LTBR THE JUDGMENT OF COUR'l'S EXCEFT Dl 
9 
INLJTi\lllCES PR.OVXD&D i'Oit PRIOR TO 'l'BB TDCB 
THE JUDGMBlft WAS IUDIDERBJ). 
It ia to be remembered that for the 
pur1XJse of this appeal the facts set 
forth in the petition for writ of habea• 
corpue muat be ua-4 to JDe true. In 
the petition it i• &1llllf9d that ta. 
District Co\l~ of a.al• J.ake Coriaty 
ordered the }*titi•ar Ille eOD.fi.ned and 
impriaoned ip .she Bah..•tAM l••am 
(emphallia an:re). 
J:n an •rly ~ dlloided b;r the 
supr_. CO.rt. of tile ,_.ritoa:y ., Utah 
known aa .tn 8e ."1.141• Ql.nMa,- to.ad at 
5 u. 358, tile lu.PC•···~fO&' •be 
Territory of Utab .. with a 
situation ill whJ.cb a prisoner had be-1 
convicted and B9111laaced Clift blD ablu'gea, 
one iolygamy and tM ot:ller c:a-hllW.tation. 
SUbaequently a law ,... pa.encl ~q 
10 
; .y,.: ::he c.-:hortening of sentences for good 
condu ~:t. The Court in holding that the 
subse ucnt statute could not affect the 
·.· rior nentence and conviction, stated: 
"L~ \:e should allow the act 
of the legislature passed si.nc:e 
the sentence to control, it in 
erfect is to aciy that the le«JJA-
L:tnre can, after judgment, 
nullify the ju.dgment and aet 
the 1risoner free. If the 
le~islature ca.n reduce the 
~;entence at all, subsequent 
to the sentence, it can redw:• 
.Ct to ::.:n unlimited extent. Thia 
\iou ld be encroaching upo.n the 
.:iuthority of the executive, 
els it is the p.l'OVinoe of the 
m·~ecu ti ve, and not the le9is-
la ture, to reprieve or pardon. 
It would also Qt all<"··~ig,g ,tht 
legislature 59·~9'f'C'Xi~ 
the iudicial bpnoh of tht 
qoyerDmfJD1=· and to W'HP U... 
duties. and to Mkt I MMIPCI 
apg iudgment different f;pm 
that entchJfd in cou,J'\1 • 
(emphasis ours) 
The District Court ordered the 
, er t:.:ioner to be imprisoned in the Utah 
. :. i; c i. rison. His :t-iresent confinement in 
1 1 
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1:'1c (~alifornia state Prison at Folaom, 
ca lif ~>rnia, is in violation of that 
order, and is therefore without author-
CONCLYSIQN 
rl,intiff's petition for a writ of 
~F• be,rn corpus states a cause of action 
uton .. hich relief can be granted, and 
the ;iction of the District Court in dia-
1;iL::sin·-; said petition should be reversed. 
Respectfully aubnitted, 
MARK & SCHOBIDIALS 
,-~w 
903 Kearns Building 
salt Lake City 1, Utah 
12 
Attorneys for 
:Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
) 
(• ~ .•. 
Re.::ei ved t.wo copies of the foregoing 
Brit~f this 15th day of January, 1965. 
Attorney General of the 
state of Utah 
BY.---------------------
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